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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

DEFAMATION OF A PUBLIC OFFICIAL: THE
NEW YORK TIMES CASE IN PERSPECTIVE
On March 9, 1964, the United States Supreme Court decided the case
of New York Times v. Sullivan," holding that the first amendment protected libelous statements concerning "public officials," even misstatements
of fact, absent a showing of "actual malice." In so doing, the Court has
disjointed the holdings of some thirty-six jurisdictions and has, to a considerable extent, subjected the common law of libel to federal standards.
The purpose of this comment is 'to examine and reconsider the law of
libel, concentrating on that area affected by the relatively recent holding
of the Supreme Court. Secondly, the holding of the Court willbe analyzed
and studied for the underlying importance which it represents, concentrating also oh the recurring problems that the broad language of the
decision has conceived. The main objective is to pinpoint and to predict
the future effects of the decision. And 'lastly, to illustrate the -effect of
this decision upon those state- constitutions requiring truth coupled with
good motives and justifiable ends, as the only defense to libel actions;
specifically, the Illinois Constitution, article II, section 4.
'It should be noted, however, that despite the fact that the: Times decision has been implemented to 'include. actions for criminal .libel, this
comment has not attempted to cover that area, but rather has been limited
to'a discussion of civil libel.
LIBEL AND ITS DEFENSES

Implicit in any discussion of the law of libel is the understanding that
when one person communicates matter tending to hold another up to
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or causing him to be shunned by his fellows,
the party being defamed'has-a cause of action against his: defamer. Instead
of attempting to cover all the imaginable communications giving rise to
such a right, suffice it to say that matter tending to injure one in his
reputation, or depriving him of his respect or esteem, will allow plaintiff
2
an opportunity to recover.
At common law, the mandatory elements of the libel action were three;
falsehood, malice and injury. 'In some instances, the communication
amounted to libel per se, that is, the matter published was held to be
libelous on its face without the aid of inducement, innuendo, or col1376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2 For a comprehensive study of the varied accusations giving rise to the action of libel
see PROSSER, TORTS (3rd ed. 1964); BOWER, ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION (2d ed. 1923);
SALMOND, TORTS (8th ed. 1934);
13 MINN. L. REv. 21 (1928).

Wettech, Recent Developments in Newspaper Libel,
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loquium.3 Being libel per se, the law presumed the necessary elements, including damages, from the character of the publication alone. However,
in the majority of jurisdictions where extrinsic facts are necessary to make
out the defamatory meaning conveyed, -such statements are considered4
merely libelous per quod, actionable only on proof of special damages.
On the other hand, if the imputation of the matter conveyed is capable
ofincorporation into one of the following categories, special damages
need not be shown.5 The first of these categories is that in which there
is a crime involving moral turpitude,6 subjecting the guilty party to an
infamous punishment.7 It was not important that the charge imputed a
3 Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, 50 TLR 581, 99 ALR 864 (1934);
Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, 2 K.B. 331 (1929); Thorley v. Lord Kerry,
4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng Rep 367 (1812); Starks v. Comer, 190 Ala. 245, 67 So. 440 (1914);
First Nat. Bank v. N. R. McFall & Co., 144 Ark. 149, 222 S.W. 40 (1920); Lewis v.
Hayes, 177 Cal. 587, 171 Pac. 293 (1918); Jones v. Register & Leader Co., 177 Iowa 144,
158 N.W. 571 (1916); Godin v. Niebuhr, 236 Mass. 350, 128 N.E. 406 (1920).
..
4 Rose v. Indianapolis Newspapers, 213 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1954); Ilitzky v. Goodman,
57 Ariz. 216, 112 P.2d 860 (1941); Karrigan v. Valentine, 184 Kan. 783, 339 P.2d 52
(1959); Towles v. Travelers Ins. Co., 282 Ky. 147, 137 S.V. 2d 1110 (1940); Langworthy
v. Pulitizer Publ. Co., 368 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1963); Chase v. New Mexico Publ. Co.,
53 N.M. 145, 203 P.2d 594 (1949); Becker v. Toulmin, 165 Ohio St. 549, 138 N.E.2d 391
(1956); Edwards v. Crane, 292 P.2d 1034 (Okla. 1956); Brown v. National Home Ins
Co, 239 S.Car 488, 123 S.E.2d 850 (1962).

5 Caldwell v. Crowell-Collier Pub. Co, 161 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1947); Broklng v.
Phoenix Newspapers, 76 Ariz. 334, 264 P.2d 413 (1953):; Rachels v. Deener, 182 Ark.
931, 33 S.W.2d 39 (1930); Harrison v. Burger, 212 Ala. 670, 103 So. 842 (1925); Gustin
v. Evening Press Co, 172 Mich. 311, 137 N.W. 674 (1912); Foley v. Hoffman, 188 Md.
273, 52 A.2d 476 (1947); Creekmore v. Runnels, 359 Mo. 1020, 224 S.W.2d 1007 (1949).
6 Conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals: Marsh v. State
Bar of California, 210 Cal. 303, 291 Pac. 583 (1930). An act of baseness, depravity, or
vileness in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to
the public in general: Sipp v. Coleman, 179 Fed. 997 (D.N.J. 1910); In re Henry, 15
Idaho 755 (1909); Amick v. Montross, 206 Iowa 51 (1928); Hughey v, Bradrick, 39
Ohio App. 486, 177 N.E. 911 (1931); Traders & General Ins Co. v. Russell, 99 S.W.2d
1079 (Tex. Civ App. 1936).
7 Punishment by imprisonment in a state prison or penitentiary: United States v.
Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922); Maxey v. United States, 207 Fed. 327 (8th Cir. 1913);
Flanagan v. Jepson, 177 Iowa 393, 158 N.W. 641 (1916); Lee v. Stanfill, 171 Ky 71, 186
S.W. 1196 (1916); Hull v. Donze, 164 La. 199, 113 So. 816 (1927). Punishment by
death or imprisonment in a penitentiary: Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348 (1886);
Earley v. Winn, 129 Wis. 291, 109 N.W. 633 (1906). Requiring moral turpitude above:
Halley v. Gregg, 74 Iowa 563, 38 N.W. 416 (1888); Brown v. Nickerson, 5 Gray
(Mass.) 1 (1885); Larson v. R. B. Wrigley Co., 183 Minn. 28, 235 N.W. 393 (1931);
Kelly v. Flaherty, 16 R.I. 234, 14 Atl. 876 (1888). Requiring moral turpitude and infamous punishment: Shan v. Killingsworth, 213 Ala. 655, 106 So. 138 (1925); Amick v.
Montross, 206 Iowa 51, 220 N.W. 51 (1928); Woodville v. Pizatti, 119 Miss. 85, 80 So.
491 (1919); Cline v. Holdrege, 122 Neb. 151, 239 N.W. 6-,9 (1931); Jones v. Brinkley,
174 N.C. 23, 93 S.E. 372 (1917); Barnett v. Phelps, 97 Ore. 242, 191 Pac. 502 (1920).
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crime already punished, 8 or for which prosecution was barred, 9 because
social ostracism, not danger of criminal prosecution, was the basis for
the exception.
The second category, wherein one is charged with having a loathsome
disease, has as its basis of recovery the exclusion from society that would
result. Historically, the exception was limited to charges of venereal
disease' or leprosy.'1 With the progress of medical science in reducing
the number of incurable diseases, the exception no longer includes charges
of insanity, tuberculosis, and the like, and is restricted to its original
12
meaning.
The third category consists of any charge that directly affects a person
in his business, office, or means of support." But here the statement must
14
be directly incompatible with the business or profession of the plaintiff,
while a more general reflection upon his character, lacking this special
significance, would not be sufficient."'
The last category deals with a charge involving the imputation of un8 Wiley v. Campbell, 21 Ky. 396 (1827); Krebs v. Oliver, 78 Mass 239 (1858); Smith
v. Stewart, 5 Pa. 372 (1847).
9 Stewart v. Howe, 177 I1171 (1855) (infancy); French v. Creath, I 111 31 (1820)
(statute creating offense repealed); Tenney v. Clement, 10 N.H. 52 (1838) (person
said to have been murdered alive); Van Ankin v. Westfall, 14 Johns (N.Y.) 233 (1817);
Brightman v. Davies, 3 N.J. Misc 113, 127 Atl. 327 (1925).
10 McDonald v. Nugent, 122 Iowa 651, 98 N.W. 506 (1904); Sally v. Brown, 220
Ky. 576, 295 S.W. 890 (1927); Williams v. Holdredge, 22 Barb (N.Y.) 396 (1854);
Kaucher v. Blinn, 29 Ohio St. 62 (1875); Crittal v. Horner, 80 Eng. Rep. 366 (1619).

11 Lewis v. Hayes, 165 Cal. 527, 132 Pac. 1022 (1913); Simpson v. Press Pub. Co, 33
Misc. 228, 67 N.Y.S. 401 (1900).
12 Rade v. Press Publ. Co, 37 Misc. 254, 75 N.Y.S. 298 (1902); Kassowitz v. Sentinel
Co, 226 Wise. 468, 277 N.W. 177 (1938).
13 Daherty v. Lynett, 155 Fed. 681 (D. Pa. 1907); Correia v. Santos, 191 Cal. App. 2d
844, 13 Cal. Rpts. 132 (1961); Carter v. Sterling Finance Co, 132 So. 2d 430 (Fla. App.
1961); Foley v. Hoffman, supra note 5; Fitzgerald v. Piette, 180 Wisc. 625, 193 N.W. 86
(1923).
14Nolan v. Standard Publ. Co, 67 Mont. 212, 216 Pac. 571 (1923)

charge that an

attorney was a shyster); Louisville Taxicab and Transfer Co v. Ingle, 229 Ky. 518,
17 S.W.2d 709 (1929) (that a chauffeur is a habitual drunkard); Cobbs v. Chicago Defender, 308 Ill. App. 55, 31 N.E.2d 323 (1941) (that a clergyman was subject to scandalous rumor); Cruikshank v. Gorden, 118 N.Y. 178, 23 NE. 457 (1890) (that a physician
was called a butcher).
15 Damscey v. Hollway, 2 K.B. 441 (1901) (where it was said that an attorney had
lost thousands of dollars); Lumby v. AlIday, 148 Eng. Rep. 1434 (1831) (where it was

said the company clerk consorted with prostitutes); Liebel v. Montgomery Ward &
Co, 103 Mont. 370, 62 P.2d 667 (1936)

(where it was charged that a stenographer

did not pay her bills); Vinson v. O'Malley, 25 Ariz. 552, 220 Pac. 393 (1923) (where
it was charged that a physician had committed adultery); Gurtler v. Union Parts Mfg.
Co., 285 App. Div. 643, 140 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1955) (where it was charged that an engineer was a communist).
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chastity to a female. Males are excluded because the injury to reputation
is presumed not as great. It should be noted that at common law such an
exception did not exist, but has been included within this category by
statutory enactment, 16 or by an understanding of the statement as not
mere unchastity, but a charge of fornication ox adultery, 7 both of which
are criminal acts involving infamous punishment or moral turpitude.
To reiterate then, if a statement merely contains libelous matter upon
the showing of extrinsic facts, but such matter fails to qualify for one
of the above mentioned categories, the party claiming such will not succeed in recovering unless there is included allegation and proof of
special damages.
Assuming the plaintiff has the necessary requirements for a prima facie
case, the next point of interest is the method by which the defendant may
defeat liability for his alleged defamatory remarks.
The defenses to civil libel, with which we are more concerned, include
those of truth and privilege. Because of the relatively recent importance
placed upon the area of "privilege" in the law of libel, a more detailed
and analytical study will be made on this subject than on the defense
of truth.
Generally, in all jurisdictions there exists a truth defense, qualified in
some states, including Illinois, with the requirement that the matter must
be published ". . . with good motives and for justifiable ends . . .""
The first Illinois constitution 9 did not impose such a restriction on the
truth defense in civil actions, but in 1869, the Illinois constitutional provision was amended to its present form, requiring good motives and justifiable ends. 20 Not until 1911 was this question considered by the Illinois
16 Smith v. Gafford 31 Ala. 45 (1857); Pink v. Catanich, 51 Cal. 420 (1876); Richter
v. Stolze, 158 Mich. 594, 123 N.W. 13 (1909); Vanloon v. Vanloon, 159 Mo. App. 255,
140 S.W. 631 (1911).
17 Reitan v. Goebel, 33 Minn. 151, 122 N.W. 291 (1885); Davis v. Sladden, 17 Ore.
259, 21 Pac. 140 (1889); Kelley v. Flaherty, 16 R.I. 234, 14 Atl. 867 (1888); Zeliff v.
Jennings, 61 Tex. 458 (1884). Recent decisions have simply recognized the rule without discussion: Hallman v. Brody, 16 Alaska 308, 233 F.2d 877 (1956); Biggerstaff v.
Zimmerman, 108 Colo. 194, 114 P.2d 1098 (1941); Cushing v. Hederman, 117 Iowa 637,
91 N.W. 940 (1902); Cooper v. Seaverns, 81 Kan. 267, 105 Pac. 509 (1909); Battles
v. Tyson, 77 Neb. 563, 110 N.W. 299 (1906); Gnapinsky v. Goldyn, 23 N.J. 243, 128
A.2d 697 (1957).
18 ILL. CONST. art. II, § 4. However, the English rule held truth to be a complete
defense to such an action, as do the majority of states. See generally TOWNSEND,
SLANDER AND LIBEL (4th ed. 1890); Ray, Truth: A Defense To a Libel, 16 MINN. L.
REV. 43 (1931); Harnett and Thornton, The Truth Hurts: A Critique of a Defense
to Defamation, 35 VA. L. REV. 425 (1949); RESTATEMENti, TORTS § 582 (1938).
19 ILL. CoNsT. art. II, § 4 (1818).
20 See 2 DEBATES OF THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 177 (1870): After the
proposed change of section 4 was read, one delegate, Mr. Bromwell, remarked: "It
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courts, and in the decisions that followed, the courts never directly
treated the issue. 21 In 1919, the Illinois Supreme Court, in the case of

Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co.,22 conclusively held that truth alone
was not a defense, but must be coupled with good motives and justifiable
ends. Nonetheless, great confusion has resulted, because the Illinois courts
have not expressly construed the substantive meaning of the truth defense.
Furthermore, in jurisdictions holding that truth alone, or truth coupled
with good motives and justifiable ends, constitutes an adequate defense,
the literal truth need not be shown. It has been held that a showing of
substantial, and not literal, truth affords sufficient grounds for defense.
The second defense to libel is that of privilege, both absolute and qualified. The former applies when society values the communication as highly
important, whereas the latter applies when the public policy is of lesser
importance.
The first classification of the absolute privilege has been generally designated judicial proceedings.2 3 Included within this are defamations by
24
judges, jurors, litigants, counsel, and statements made in judicial opinions.
However, except with respect to judges and jurors, it is required that
25
the communications be relevant or pertinent to the proceeding at hand.
seems to me that the language used here does not express our meaning .... Heretofore
the law had been that in a civil cause the truth has been sufficient justification, however published."
21 La Monte v. Kent, 163 I11.
App. 1 (1911); Szimkus v. Ragauckas, 189 Ill. App.
407 (1914).
22288 I11.
App. 405, 123 N.E. 587 (1919). There are few jurisdictions which maintain the same or similar position as the Illinois courts, those so holding including the
following: Stanley v. Prince, 118 Me. 360, 108 At. 328 (1919); Briggs v. Brown, 55
Fla. 417, 46 So. 325 (1908); Wertz v. Sprecher, 82 Neb. 834, 118 N.W. 1071 (1908);
Conner v. Standard Pub. Co., 183 Mass. 474, 67 N.E. 596 (1903); Buckhart v. North
American Co., 214 Pa. 39, 63 Atd. 410 (1906); Star Publishing Co. v. Donahoe, 58 Atl.
513 (Del. 1904); Hutchins'v. Page, 75 N.H. 215, 72 Atl. 689 (1909).
23 The term judicial proceeding has been held to include any hearing before a
tribunal performing a judicial function, ex parte or not: Gunter v. Reeves, 198 Miss.
31, 21 So.2d 468 (1945); Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 118 NE.2d 356 (1954)
(lunacy hearing); Abrams v. Crompton-Richmond Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 811, 170
N.Y.S.2d 981 (1958) (bankruptcy); Nickovich v. Mallart, 51 Nev. 306, 274 Pac. 809
(1929) (naturalization); Penick v. Ratcliffe, 149 Va. 618, 140 S.E. 664 (1927) (election
contests).
24Sidener v. Russel, 34 111.App. 446 (1889); Massey v. Jones, 182 Va. 200, 28
S.E.2d 623 (1944); Waldo v. Morrison, 220 La. 1006; 58 So.2d 210 (1952); Cotonio v.
Guglielmo, 176 La. 421, 146 So. 11 (1933).
25 In Scott v. Statesville Plywood and Veneer Co., 240 N.C. 73, 76, 81 S.E.2d 146,
149 (1954), the court intimated the liberality of the "relevance": ".

.

. the matter to

which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably irrelevant to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy or impropriety."
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The scope of the absolute privilege also incorporates communications
made by executive officers of the federal government. 26 In the past, the
courts have restricted the application of this immunity to those within
the higher echelons of the government. In Barr v. Matteo,27 however,
the United States Supreme Court held that the privilege extends to all
federal personnel. But the protection was held to attach only to those
communications made "within the outer perimeter" of their line of duty.
The main reason underlying the Court's extension of the doctrine was
that the qualified privilege would have resulted in a restriction upon the
functioning of such officers. Under such a limited scope of protection,
the officer might possibly be subjected to numerous libel suits, demanding
use of his time for refutation, and subjecting his official conduct to the
unreliable judgment of a jury.
The courts have also concluded that actions for defamatory statements
made in legislative proceedings would jeopardize the procedural system
which is necessary to accomplish the legislative business, and have therefore
allowed an absolute privilege for statements made in such proceedings.
This privilege has not been hampered by limitations of relevancy. In
fact, many state constitutions provide that the privilege extends to anything said in the course of the legislative proceedings. For example, the
Illinois Constitution, article IV, section 14 states:
Senators and Representatives shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, or breach
of the peace, be privileged from arrest during the session of the General Assembly, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or
debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place. 28
26 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 438 (1896), involving the Postmaster General; Pearson
v. Wright, 156 F. Supp. 136, (D.D.C. 1957), the chairman of a federal commission;
Lyons v. Howard, 250 F.2d 912 (lst Cir., 1958), a naval officer.
27 360 U.S. 564 (1959). For a fuller discussion of the absolute privilege of executive
communications, see: Handler & Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits
against Government Executive Officials, 74 HARV. L. REV. 44 (1960); Gray, Private
Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REV. 303 (1959); Note, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875
(1956).
28 ILL. CONST. art. IV. S 14 (emphasis added). The same provision is found in many
state constitutions and in the federal constitution (U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 6, clause 1). For
the English origin of this privilege, see Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation,
10 COLvM. L. REV. 131 (1910). Some 36 jurisdictions have the same or similar provision in their state constitutions. This privilege has been held to include statements in
the Congressional record: Methodist Federation for Social Action v. Eastland, 141
F.Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1956). However, this immunity ceases upon republication of the
same outside of the legislature: McGovern v. Martz, 182 F.Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 1960).
There has been a division of authority as to whether the absolute privilege envisions
statements made by state legislatures and inferior municipal bodies. The majority of
courts and the RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 590 (1938), deny such a privilege. However,
there is authority that the Illinois courts include within the scope of the absolute
privilege legislative proceedings of federal, state or municipal origin. See Larson v.
Doner, 32 Il. App. 2d 471, 178 N.E.2d 399 (1961).
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When matter contains a defamatory effect, and there is an intermediate
degree of importance therein related to public interest, the law has recognized such statements to be qualifiedly, conditionally, or defeasibly
privileged. The extent of this privilege is far-reaching, and includes statements made for the interest of others, for the interest of the publisher, or
where there is a common interest, i.e., both the procurer and the recipient
have an interest in the communication. The protection also extends to
reports of public proceedings, fair comment on matters of public concern,
and communications to one who may act in the public interest.
The privilege involving interest of others arises when some definite
legal relationship exists between the publisher and the person on whose
behalf the matter was published. 29 It is evident, therefore, that the defendant-publisher cannot be a mere officious intermeddler, but rather
must base his intervention upon some legal, moral, or social duty. An
example of this would be that an attorney could speak out in the interest
of his client.
Another problem arises in relation to the procurement of the information. Some courts refuse to grant the privilege where the information is
volunteered, while other courts follow opposite reasoning. The better
position appears to be that the method of procurement should be one
of the factors to be considered regarding the importance of the interest
sought to be protected.
When matter has been published because of the interest of the publisher, some writers have compared liability to self-defense, in that the
privilege arises to communicate defamatory media for the protection of
one's interests, that is, that which is reasonably necessary to defend his
reputation against him who utters the defamation. But if this publication
has been excessive or published for some improper motive, or the publication is not reasonably believed to be necessary to accomplish the
purpose for which the occasion is privileged, or there is a lack of reasonable grounds for belief in the truth of the defamatory matter, then the
privilege has been "abused" and there is no protection.30
The third classification of the qualified privileges occurs where the
defendant has an interest in the subject matter of the communication
and the person to whom it is related has a corresponding interest or a
relevant duty. This privilege has included those communications among
persons having business dealings, and members of a group wherein there
exists a common pecuniary interest. Moreover, the scope of the protection
29 Toogood v. Spyring, 1 C.M.&R. 181, 193, 149 Eng. Rep. 1044, 1049-50 (Ex. 1834),
wherein the court maintained such a privilege exists when it is "fairly made by a
person in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal or moral, or in
the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where his interest is concerned."
30 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §§ 600-605 (1938); Wettach, Recent Developments in
Newspaper Libel, 13 MiNN. L. REv. 21 (1928).
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applies to members of groups with a non-pecuniary relation, among
which the more common relationships are religious, social, educational,
fraternal, political, professional, and economic in nature.3 '
When one communicates the reports of public proceedings, no matter
the extent to which the matter may be defamatory, it is privileged, based
on the theory that any member of the public might, if he were present,
see and hear for himself. In effect, the party publishing the report is
merely the substitute for the public eye. This privilege encompasses all
proceedings that are public, including investigations of committees, meetings of municipal councils, acts of executive and administrative officials
32
of all levels of government, and all legislative proceedings.
In the area of public interest, there is well-reasoned authority to divide
this section into two privileges, namely, the public interest privilege, and
the privilege of fair comment on matters of public concern. The former
involves communications broad as to content (including misstatements
of fact) but limited regarding those to whom it may be communicated.
It may be communicated to those who may be expected to act for the
benefit of the complainant on some matter involving the interest of the
public. Included among these are communications by private citizens to
proper authorities for the prevention of crime or, for example, complaints
made by members of the public to school board members in relation to
a teacher's competency. Of equal importance are communications between
public officials. Where not held to be absolutely privileged, they may,
if the facts allow, meet the standards of the "public interest" privilege, of
which the most important is good faith.33
The counterpart of the public interest privilege can be termed fair
comment on matters of public concern. This privilege grants immunity
"to those matters which are of legitimate concern to the community as
a whole because they materially affect the interests of all the community. '34 Fair comment, as the name implies, encompasses comment, not
fact, on all matters of public concern, of which the essential requirements
are
(1) that the publication is an opinion; (2) that it relates not to an individual
but to his acts; (3) that it is fair; namely, that the reader can see the factual
3' For example, Slocinski v. Radwan, 83 N.H. 501, 144 At. 787 (1929), wherein
members of a church discussed the morals of their minister; Raininger v. Prickett, 192

Okla. 486, 137 P.2d 595 (1943), involving discussion of proposed new member in a
fraternal order. See also, Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L. REV. 314 (1935).
32Cresson v. Louisville Courier Journal, 299 Fed. 487' (6th Cir. 1924); Swede v.
Passaic Daily News, 30 N.J. 320, 153 A.2d 36 (1959); Brandon v. Gazette Publishing
Co., 234 Ark. 332, 352 S.W.2d 92 (1961). See Barnett, The Privilege of Defamation
by Private Report of Public Official Proceedings, 31 ORE. L. REV. 185 (1952).
33
Bingham v. Gaynor, 203 N.Y. 27, 96 N.E. 84 (1911).
3

4 PROSSER, ToRTs

812

(3rd ed. 1964).
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basis of the comment and draw his own conclusion; and (4) that the publication
relates to a matter of public interest.3 5
Furthermore, attention must be given to the fact that in the area of public
officials a minority of jurisdictions maintain that the qualified immunity
of "fair comment" includes within its scope misstatements of fact. Under
the rule, one need not have the accurate factual basis for the comment
thereon, but rather can draw comment from misstated facts and remain
immune from suit.3 6 However, the majority of courts have refused to
adopt the liberal application espoused by the minority position, and have
steadfastly demanded correct statements of facts as the just and primary
87
requisite of the fair comment privilege, even as applied to public officials.
35

Brewer v. Hearst Publishing Co., 185 F.2d 846, 848. (7th Cir. 1950).

36 The leading case in support of the minority position is Coleman v. MacLennan,

78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908), in which the court stated the conditions necessary
for the rule to operate, namely absence of malice, reasonable grounds to believe, and
a publication which is not excessive in view of the purpose of the article. In agreement
with the Coleman decision are approximately eleven states: Snively v. Record Pub.
Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. 1 (1921); Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co.,
142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955); Pearce v. Brower, 72 Ga. 243 (1884); Salinger v.
Cowles, 195 Iowa 873, 191 N.W. 167 (1922); Stenson v. Wallace, 144 Kan. 730, 62
P.2d 907 (1936); Clancy v. Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1, 277 N.W. 264 (1938);
Lafferty v. Houlihan, 81 N.H. 67, 121 A. 92 (1923); Alexander v. Vann, 180 N.C. 187,
104 S.E. 360 (1920), Jackson v. Pittsburgh Times, 152 Pa. 406, 25 Atl. 613 (1893);
Boucher v. Clark Publishing Co., 14 S.D.72. 84 N.W. 237 (1900); Williams v. Standard
Examiner Publishing Co., 83 Utah 31, 27 P.2d 1 (1933); Posnett v. Marble, 62 Vt.
481, 20 At. 813 (1889).
37 Under the majority view, a false assertion of fact, even in the absence of malice,
of and concerning one in public life, is as actionable as would be such a statement concerning one in private life. The states supporting this view are Parsons v. Age-Herald
Pub. Co., 181 Ala. 439, 61 So. 345 (1913); Arizona Pub. Co. v. Harris, 20 Ariz. 446,
181 Pac. 373 (1919); Star Pub. Co. v. Donahoe, 58 Atl. 513 (Del. 1904); Washington
Times v. Bonner, 86 F.2d 836 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Kirkland v. Constitution Pub. Co.,
38 Ga. App. 632, 144 S.E. 821 (1928); Democrat Pub. Co. v. Harvey, 181 Ky. 730, 205
S.W. 908 (1918); Levert v. Daily States Pub. Co., 123 La. 594, 49 So. 206 (1909); Powers
v. Cary, 64 Me. 9 (1874); A. S. Abell Co. v. Kirby, 227 Md. 267, 176 A.2d 340 (1961);
Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 28 N.E. 1 (1891); Foster v. Scripps,
39 Mich. 376, 33 Am. Rep. 403 (1878); Oakes v. State, 98 Miss. 80, 54 So. 79 (1910);
Merriam v. Star-Chronicle Pub. Co., 335 Mo. 937, 74 S.W.2d 592 (1934); Estelle v.
Daily News Pub. Co., 99 Neb. 397, 156 N.W. 645 (1916); Lindsey v. Evening Journal
Association, 10 N.J. Mis. R. 1275, 163 Atl. 245 (1932); Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94,
75 N.E.2d 257 (1947); Murphy v. Farmers Educational & Coop. Union, 75 N.W.2d 636
(N.D. 1955); Westropp v. E. W. Scripps Co., 148 Ohio St. 365, 74 N.E.2d 340 (1947);
Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. Kendall, 96 Okla. 194, 221 Pac. 762 (1923); Marr v. Putnam,
196 Ore. 1, 246 P.2d 509 (1952); Tiepke v. Times Pub. Co., 20 R.I. 200, 37 Ad. 1031
(1897); Jackson v. Record Pub. Co., 175 S.C. 211. 178 S.E. 833 (1935); Fort Worth
Press Co. v. Davis, 96 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Carpenter v. Meredith, 122 Va.
446, 96 S.E. 635 (1918); Owens v. Scott Publishing Co., 46 Wash. 2d 666, 284 P.2d 296
(1955); Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W.Va. 158 (1878); Lukaszewicz v. Dziadulewicz, 198
Wis. 605, 225 N.W. 172 (1929).
Illinois also concurs with the majority position. See Pape v. Time, Inc, 318 F.2d 652
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Even though an overwhelming number of states have refused to make
privileged false assertions of fact, the Supreme Court, in New York
Times v. Sullivan,3 s found it necessary to so rule. The court vindicated
the former minority position, establishing it as the national standard obligatory upon all states, when public officials are involved. The basis for
the decision is founded upon the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expression in the first amendment. Apparently', the Court desired no
misconception of its pronouncement, for as Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits
a public official from recovering damages for defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual
malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."39
In New York Times v. Sullivan, wherein a police commissioner brought
suit for an advertisement allegedly defaming him in his official capacity,
the Court reversed the Supreme Court of Alabama's damage award of
$500,000. This decision became the first instance in which the Court applied the first amendment to the law of libel,40 and held that "libel can
claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be
'4 1
measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment."
The first amendment, as interpreted by this Court, is designed to guarantee freedom of expression upon public questions, so as to "assure unfet(7th Cir. 1963); Van Norman v. The Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 31 111. App. 2d 314, 175
N.E.2d 805 (1961); Proesel v. Myers Publishing Company., 24 111.App. 2d 501, 165 N.E.
2d 352 (1960); Belt v. Tribune Co, 6 I11.App. 2d 489, 128 N.E. 2d 638 (1955); Cook v.
East Shore Newspapers, 327 Ill. App. 559, 64 N.E. 2d 751 (1945); Hotz v. Alton Telegraph Printing Co., 324 I11.App. 1, 57 N.E. 2d 137 (1944); Ogren v. Rockford Star Pub.
Co., 288 I11.405, 123 N.E. 587 (1919); Cooper v. Lawerence, 204 Ill. App. 261 (1917);
People v. Fuller, 238 Ill. 116 (1909).
3
aSupra note 1.
39 Id. at 279-280.
40
For example, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942), the
Court stated the following: "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise
any constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or fighting words."
The evident change in the Court's thinking is aptly shown by Justice Brennan: "libel
can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured
by standards that satisfy the First Amendment" (supra note 1 at 269). Other instances
where the Court, previous to the Times decision, expressed this idea can be seen in the
opinions of the following: Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1957);
Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48 (1961); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 486 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1950); Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331, 348-9 (1946). See also, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931),
wherein the Court said "the common law rules that subject the libeler to responsibility
... are not abolished by the protection extended in our constitution."
41 Supra note 1 at 269.
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tered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people. '42 Applied to the case at hand, the advertisement contained grievances and protests of the people on a public issue,
segregation, and thereby qualified for this freedom of expression espoused
by the Court. The Court wanted no misconception as to the extent of the
protection to be afforded, as is evidenced by Mr. Justice Brennan's language: ". . . debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
' 43
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.

The Court then proceeded, in rather apt language, to sweep away the
holding of some thirty-six jurisdictions by finding that erroneous statements
on debated public issues are inevitable. Therefore, to provide, "breathing
space" necessary to express such erroneous statements concerning a public official, that official may only recover an award of damages upon proof
that the false statement was generated by "actual malice-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
'44
false or not."
In reaching this conclusion, the Court, in effect, revitalized the first
amendment with historic meaning. The central meaning of the first amendment entails a core of protection for speech necessary for democratic government to function. As Madison often said, the censorial power must rest
42 Roth v. United States, supra note 40 at 484.
4 Supra note 1 at 270.
44 Id. at 279-280. A great deal of discussion has centered upon what theory of the
Constitution was applied to the Times case. Justice Brennan, who gave the opinion of
the Court, suggests none of the traditional tests, such as the clear and present danger,
redeeming social value, or the balancing tests, were utilized in formulating this opinion.
But rather, the Court examined history to discern the "central meaning of the first
amendment," and arrived at a theory quite similar to that of Dr. Meiklejohn. In fact, at
the conclusion of his article in the Harvard Law Review, Justice Brennan implies
the interpretation of the first amendment espoused by Dr. Meiklejohn has nearly been
realized. See: Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejobn Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965). See also, Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, in 1961 SUPREME COURT REvIEw 245 (Kurland ed.). According to
Meiklejohn, the activities important to the freedom to vote, and those activities included
within the forms of thought and expression that are necessary to exercise "a proper
judgment" in casting his ballot are of "governing importance" and for which the first
amendment grants unqualified protection. This, in effect, is an absolutist position, but
this position is not akin to that "absolutist" position of Justice Black, because according to Meiklejohn the area of private defamation is not so covenanted, but rather it only
extends to ".

.

. public issues concerning which, under our form of government, he

[citizen] has authority, and is assumed to have competence, to judge. Though private
libel is subject to legislative control, political or seditious libel is not." (Id. at 259.)
The difference, then, between these two absolutist positions is a matter of degree, and
not of theory. Finally, as Justice Brennan states, the position of Dr. Meiklejohn is finally
arriving upon the scene of American constitutional law. The question is, whether Justice Black's position appears so untenable as to warrant such diverse attack?
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with the people over the government: "the people, not the government,
possess the absolute immunity. '45 The apparent objective of Mr. Justice
Brennan, in quoting the words of Madison, was to establish the foundation
of free expression for the citizen critic. In so doing, Mr. Justice Brennan
implied that to enforce governmental sanctions upon one expressing criticism of the operative functions of government officials would certainly be
contra to the inherent meaning of the first amendment. To emphasize the
importance of the criticism, Justice Brennan wrote, "It is as much his [the
citizen's] duty to criticize as it is the official's duty to administer. '46 What
the Court intended by such language was a direct constitutional attack
upon the Alien and Sedition Acts passed by Congress, that is, the Court
held that the first amendment expressly forbids such governmental restriction on expression. Since the ruling of the Alabama Court was so akin
to such a penalty, the Court held such speech to be within the ambit of
protected speech:
Raising as it does the possibility that a good faith critic of government will
be penalized, for his criticism, the proposition relied on by the Alabama courts
strikes at7 the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free expression.4
The Court found an analogous consideration to support the privilege for
the citizen critic of government and its officials, in reference to Barr v.
Mateo,48 wherein the Court held defamatory utterances of federal officials
to be absolutely privileged if made "within the outer perimeter" of his
duties. This immunity relieves the official of the possible threat of lawsuits
so as not to "inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of
policies of government .... ,,4 The court then reasoned that if the official
has this privilege, the citizen-critic of government destined to be the purveyor of the operative ability of such administrators must have a similar
privilege, for as Justice Brennan reasoned, "[i]t would give public servants
an unjustified preference over the public they serve, if critics of official
conduct did not have a fair equivalent of the immunity granted to the officials themselves." 50 Concluding that this type of immunity was constitutionally required of the federal and state governments by the first and
fourteenth amendments, the Court gave constitutional status to a variant
of the fair comment privilege, i.e., misstatements of fact by the citizencritic in respect to the functions of public officials. Thus, it appears that
the New York Times decision has adopted the former minority holding.
However, this is not the case, because the minority position conditioned
454

Annals 934 (1794).

40 Meiklejohn, supra note 44.
47

Id. at 292.

4

sSupra note 27.

49

Supra note 27 at 571.

50 Supra note 1 at 282-83.
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the privilege on the fact' that there must be an honest belief in the truth of
the statement, whereas the Times rule limits the privilege only upon a finding of "actual malice."
"NEW YORK TIMES" APPLIED

Since the Times decision, there has been a plethora of comment, both
pro and con, with respect to the practicability of the Court's ruling. The
main argument against the decision denounces the free reign given to the
press, the sole encumberance being a showing of "actual malice." The
Court's advocates foresee the decision as an aid to the commentators who
contribute to the rational processes of public opinion and the free flow of
information so essential to the democratic way of life. But those who disapprove of the ruling foresee a slackening of responsibility, resulting in
unjustified publications of charges and virulent attacks on reputation. Furthermore, the law prior to the Times case, at least in the majority of states,
had the effect of insuring the authenticity of facts offered for public consideration, or maybe more appropriately, digestion. The opponents of the
"actual malice" rule contend that such an unleashing of power to the press
will render insecure those interested in public life, in that they would reconsider entering public life upon contemplation of the possibility of unpleasant, unwarranted, and vicious attacks upon their conduct. And finally,
they believe that more often than not the social interest placed on individual reputation from unwarranted injury far outweighs the social interest
gained from the unrestricted dissemination of information.
In response to the above rationalization, it must be noted that the Court's
decision was founded upon freedom of expression. Throughout the years,
the Supreme Court has maintained this position, striking down the numerous attempts to restrict the freedom envisioned by the fathers of the
Constitution. The importance of this guarantee must not be underestimated. The public, in order to make knowledgeable decisions about their
officials, must be exposed to a more fluid, dynamic press, capable of reporting and commenting on those matters caught in the stream of public
concern. When too much concern is placed on an individual reputation,
the immediate consequence necessarily is the stifling of public discussion
and information vital to the efficient operation of an enlightened electorate.
In the end, therefore, one must determine which assumes a more important position upon the democratic scale, the social interest in the unfettered flow of information, or the protection of one's reputation from
unwarranted injury. The Court, in deciding, has attempted to strike a
balance between these interests by allowing a widespread privilege of
communication on the part of the press, subject only to the limitation of
"actual malice," which, theoretically, affords protection to the individual's
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reputation. Although it appears that the Court did weigh the interests presented, the Times ruling was not so decided. Actually, the Court viewed
the problem essentially in terms of free press, reasoning that if the press
would be liable for misstatements of fact, they "may be deterred from
voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even
though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in
court or fear of the expense of having to do so.""5
Taking the rule of the Times case, it becomes necessary to determine
what the Court intended by the words "public official." Of primary importance is the language of the Court itself, and secondly to determine
the manner in which lower federal and state courts have interpreted it. To
these ends, the following analysis shall be directed.
At first glance, an examination of Justice Brennan's opinion shows that
he borrowed a great portion of the reasoning Found in Coleman v. MacLennan,52 part of which Justice Brennan quoted: "It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and qualifications of
candidates for their suffrages. '53 The Court in the New York Times case
also approvingly quoted the jury instruction found in the Coleman case:
"This privilege extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes matters
of public concern, public men, and candidates for office. '54 But in a latter
part of the Times decision the opinion reads, "[w]e hold today the Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for libel in actions
brought by public officials . . ."55 Despite the fact the Court specifically
mentions "public officials, and only restricts a state's awarding of damages
in such cases, it is of paramount importance that one considers what Justice Brennan said in footnote 23:
51 Support for this theory can be found in Kalven, The New York Times Case:
A Note on the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 1964 SUPREME COURT REVIEW
191. In effect, he states the Court reached for the central meaning of the Constitution,
and dismissed the so-called "balancing test" in arriving at its decision. Somewhat later
Professor Kalven writes: "There is, of course, a sense in which the Court did indulge
in balancing. It did not go the whole way and give an absolute privilege to the 'citizencritic'. It left open, the possibility of liability where the defendant's actions were the
result of actual malice ...Nonetheless, the idea of balancing was eschewed in the Times
case not only by the majority but by the concurring opinions as well." (ld. at 217.)
52 Supra note 36.
53 Id. at 724, 98 Pac. at 286. Furthermore, since the Court relied considerably upon
Judge Burch's opinion from the Coleman case, the question arises, why did the Court
omit mentioning the following excerpt: "It must apply to all officers and agents of
government, municipal, state, and national; to the management of all public institutions,
educational, charitable, and penal; to the conduct of all corporate enterprises affected
with a public interest, transportation, banking, insurance; and to innumerable other
subjects involving the public welfare." (Supra note 36 at 734-35, 98 Pac. at 289.)

54

Id. at 723.

55 Supra note 1 at 283.
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We have no occasion here to determine how far down into the lower ranks
of government employees the "public official" designation would extend for
purposes of this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons who would
not be included. . . .Nor need we here determine the boundaries of the
"official conduct" concept. 56
Because the Court abstained from specifying the exactness of a "public
official," numerous federal and state courts have been plagued with the
problem of whether or not the plaintiff in a particular libel action falls
within the singular concept of "public official." Until the Court itself defines the limits of the concept, other courts become duty-bound to speculate, the result being varied applications of the rule. Justice Black's idea of
the extensiveness of the rule, however, is readily ascertainable: "An unconditional right to say what one pleases about public affairs is what I
consider to the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment."5 7
The next case to appear before the Court concerning the standard
adopted in the Times case was Garrisonv. Louisiana.58 A district attorney
criticized certain state court judges for laziness, inefficiency, and hampering his efforts to enforce vice laws. The Court aptly ruled that the Louisiana criminal defamation statute, when considered in relation with the rule
of the Times case, limits state power to impose criminal sanctions for
criticism of the official conduct of public officials. But even here, the Court
refused to delineate the boundaries of the "public official," but inferentially expressed first amendment guarantees in relation to "public issues,"
rather than "public officials."
In Rosenblatt v. Baer,59 the Court has again considered the problem of
the public official. The official in question was employed as the supervisor
of the Belknap County Recreation Area, a facility owned and operated by
Belknap County. The respondent was directly responsible to the County
Commissioners, three elected officials in charge of the county government.
Justice Brennan, again speaking for the majority, stated the "public official" rule was necessary for two reasons: first, because there is a strong interest in debate on "public issues"; and second, there is a strong interest in
debate about those persons who are in a position to significantly affect the
determination of those issues. For these reasons, therefore, matters of grave
public concern demand widespread publication to inform the public of the
conduct of their officials. This, it is conceded, can only be accomplished
by implementation of the public official rule. Justice Brennan continued
by pinpointing criticisms of government as the center of free speech, and
yet he refrained from stating whether or not governmental criticism occupied an exclusive position. Additional indication of the expansiveness of
56 Id. at 283, n. 23.
57

Id. at 297 (concurring opinion).

58 379 U.S. 64 (1964).

59 86 S.Ct. 669 (1966).
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the rule appears when he writes "that the 'public official' designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility
for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs."'6
On the day Rosenblatt v. Baer was decided, the Court considered another case involving the "public official" rule. 61 Here, the petitioner was
an assistant general manager of Pinkerton's National Detective Agency
who brought an action for defamatory statements, by a union and its officers, circulated during a union campaign. 62 Rather than incorporating
petitioner within the ambit of a public official, the Court decided the case
solely on grounds of federal pre-emption, to effectuate the statutory pur63
pose of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Having considered the extent of the decisions of the Supreme Court,
one finds that the Court gives little indication, and, in effect appears to
have evaded defining exactly who or what is included within this "public
official" concept.
In view of the necessity to ascribe some certainty to the scope of the
"public official" privilege, it is beneficial to consider the lower federal and
state court decision which have interpreted this rule.
60 Id. at 676. The application of this idea-substantial responsibility of governmental
affairs-would seem very inadequate to the case at hand, since it is difficult to imagine
a supervisor of a recreation area exercising such control, or having such an influential
role in governmental affairs.
In answer to .ahypothetical posed to the Court concerning whether or not the rule
applied to a night watchman stealing state secrets, the Court stated: "The employee's
position must be one which would invite public scrutiniy and discussion of the person
holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in controversy." (Id. at 676, n. 3.)
61 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, 86 S.Ct. 657 (1966).
See also, Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965), wherein the Court held respondents,
a county attorney and Chief of Police, to the standard of the "public official" rule of
the Times case.
62 The initial issue decided by the Court was that the National Labor Relations Act,
61 Star. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964) does not bar the maintenance of a common law libel
suit by an official of an employer subject to the Act.
63 The Court adapted the public official rule by analogy rather than by constitutional
compulsion. The reasoning of the opinion rests in Justice Brennan's words, "not only
would the threat of state libel suits dampen the ardor of labor debate, and truncate the
free discussion envisioned by the Act, but that such suits might be used as weapons of
economic coercion. Moreover, in view of the propensity of jurors to award excessive
damages for defamation, the availability of libel actions may pose a threat to the stability of labor unions and smaller employers. In order that the recognition of legitimate
state interests does not interfere with effective administration of national labor policy
the possibility of such consequences must be minimized. We therefore limit the availability of state remedies for libel to those instances in which the complainant can show
the defamatory statements were circulated with malice and caused him damage." (Supra
note 61 at 664.)
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At the outset, it would be wise to mention that some state courts have
misconstrued the holding of the Court, whereas other courts seem to have
totally ignored the rule, depending on the law of their jurisdiction prior
4
to the New York Times case.
The case of Gilberg v. Goffi65 involved an action for civil libel brought
by the law partner of the mayor of Mount Vernon. The statement made
was that the mayor's law firm had been practicing law in a city court in
matters involving conflicts of interests. The court held that since plaintiff
voluntarily became involved in the issue at hand, "plaintiff and the law firm
necessarily constituted one and the same juridical person." 66 A necessary
corollary of this decision would be that statements are not actionable
when they incidentally or negligently defame another person closely associated with the "public official." This theory was also applied by the court
in Pearson v. FairbanksPublishing Co.6 7 A public figure who advocated
the cause of a senatorial candidate was held to the rule in the Times case.
The court said that the columnist, a public figure and internationallyknown newspaper and radio columnist, should occupy the same standing
in the law as the senatorial candidate whose cause he was publicly supporting.
The court in Pauling v. News Syndicate Co.68 found the Times rule too
conservative, and after considering the practical implications of the language of the Supreme Court, stated:
Although the public official is the strongest case for the constitutional compulsion of such a privilege, it is questionable whether in principle the decision
can be so limited. A candidate for public office would seem an inevitable
candidate for extension; if a newspaper cannot constitutionally be held for
defamation when it states without malice, but cannot prove, that an incumbent
seeking reelection has accepted a bribe, it seems hard to justify holding it liable
for further stating that the bribe was offered by his opponent. Once that extension was made, the participant in public debate on an issue of grave public
concern would be next in line ....
.0
Other courts, however, are hesitant to magnify the rule beyond the
70
implied limitation of the Times case. In Fignole v. Curtis PublishingCo.,
the court followed the analogy used by Justice Brennan, in that since
plaintiff, a candidate for public office, had no absolute privilege against
64

For example, see Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. App. 1965);

Clark v. Allen, 204 A.2d 42 (Pa. Super. 1964); Walker v. Savell, 335 F. 2d 536, (Sth
Cir. 1964); H. 0. Merren & Co. v. A. H. Belo Corp., 228 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Texas,
1964).

65 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 251 N.Y.S. 2d 823 (1964).
67 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2307 (Alaska Super Ct. 1964).
68 335 F.2d 659 (2nd Cir. 1964).
60 Id. at 671.
70 34 U.S.L.

66 Id. at 527.
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liability for libelous statements made in the course of official duties, then
there is no just reason to grant such an immunity to his critics. This court,
following the logic of the Barr v. Matteo7' case, would thereby refrain
from imposing the "actual malice" standard upon a plaintiff who had no
corresponding immunity for his own defamatory statements. In effect, the
court attempted to establish an equitable arrangement in that the ordinary
rules of common-law libel would take effect 'whenever one of the parties
72
was at a disadvantage in rebutting the accusations so made.
The case of Walker v. Courier-Journaland Louisville Times Company,
Inc. 73 appears to be the only case in which the court has come to grips
with the ambiguousness of the "public official" rule. The plaintiff, retired
Supra note 27.
The majority of the courts dealing with the problem of the "public official" have,
for the most part, restrained application of the rule to those elected or appointed officials of government: federal, state, and municipal. See: Proesell v. Myers, 48 Il1. App.
2d 402, 199 N.E.2d 73 (1964), wherein the court properly extended the rule to the
president of a village; Matassa v. Bell, 246 La. 294, 164 So. 2d 332 (1964), wherein
a constable running for re-election was held to the rule; Kennedy v. Mid-Continent
Telecasting, Inc., 193 Kan. 544, 394 P.2d 400 (1964), wherein a county commissioner
was a "public official"; Fegley v. Morthimer, 204 Pa. Super. 54, 202 A.2d 125 (1964),
wherein members of school board and chairman of its planning committee were held
to be within the rule; State v. Browne, 86 N.J. Super. 217, 206 A.2d 591 (App. Div.
1965), involving a candidate for public office. Note the difference in reasoning between
the court in State v. Browne and the opinion in Fignole v. Curtis Publishing Co., supra
note 46. The court, in Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1965), noted the
extension of the rule made by the Supreme Court in Henry v. Collins, supra note 37,
to a Chief of Police, and held the Times case likewise applies to appointed as well as
elected officials. Also, in Wade v. Sterling Gazette Co., 56 Ill. App. 2d 101, 205 N.E.
2d 144 (1960), the court held a candidate for the office of mayor could only recover
damages upon a finding the statements were made maliciously.
Some courts take a very limited view of the "public official" rule. See: Spahn v.
Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1964), involving the famed
sports figure. The court held that the privilege established in the Times case was not
absolute and unconditional, but that it was conditioned. on a finding of "actual malice,"
and was applicable only to those classes of "public officials" not public figures; Dempsey
v. Time, Inc., 43 Misc., 2d 754, 252 N.Y.S. 2d 186 (1964), involving accusations that
Dempsey used "loaded" gloves to win the heavyweight championship some forty-five
years ago. Dempsey was a public figure, but the court refused to extend the ruling
of the Times case to such a class. See also, Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 14 N.Y. 2d 954, 253
N.Y.S.2d 990, 202 N.E. 2d 372 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 916 (1965), wherein the
court denied applicability of the rule to a radio and television personality; Harper v.
National Review, Inc., 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2341 (N.Y. Super. 1964), involving an individual
in a public debate; Clark v. Pearson, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2338 (D.C. D.C., 1965), wherein
the court refused to find a lobbyist involved in public affairs within the "public official" doctrine.
73246 F. Supp. 231 (D.Ky. 1965). However, the principal issue of the case concerned
the defendant's reliance on press association reports of plaintiff's conduct at Oxford,
Mississippi. The court found such reliance did not constitute such reckless disregard
of facts or knowledge of falsity as is constitutionally required to support recovery
in such an action.
71

72
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General Walker, was involved in the rioting on the campus of the University of Mississippi. General Walker charged that defendant published
reports libelling the honor, character, and reputation of his person. 74 The
opinion began by centering its reasoning upon language found in the
Times case, which alluded to extending the privilege to all matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office.7 5 Secondly, the court
refers to footnote 2370 of the Times opinion, and surmises:
From this language I believe . . . that the broad constitutional protections
afford . . . will not be limited to "public officials" only, for to have any mean-

ing the protection must be extended to other categories of individuals or perof public debate or who have become involved in
sons involved in the area 77
matters of public concern.
Otherwise, as the court points out, there is no reason for the insertion of
footnote 23. Furthermore, a second reading of footnote 23 will reveal that
the Court departed from the traditional custom of deciding cases on the
narrowest constitutional grounds. Judge Gordon finds this fact to have
"special significance to the broad language adopted in arriving at its deci-

sion

.

. .78

In summation, the court finds the concept "public man" and

not "public official" as an inescapable result of a thorough reading of the
Times case; and regarding the limits of the "public man" concept, the
court eloquently states
If any person seeks the 'spotlight' of the stage of public prominence then he
must be prepared to accept the errors of the searching beams of the glow
thereof, for only in such rays can the public know what role he plays on the
stage of public concern-often, regretfully, a stage torn in the turmoil of riot
74The charge contained statements to the effect that plaintiff had led a group of
rioters, seemingly because of his military background, against the U. S. Marshals on the
scene, coupled with statements impugning the reputation of the General for his part
taken in the riots.
75 Supra note 36.
76 Supra note 55. In footnote 23 of the Times opinion, Justice Brennan expressed that
the Court would refrain from specifying or delineating the categories of those persons
who come within the "public official" rule.
77 Supra note 73 at 233.
78 Ibid. The Court, in the Times decision, had many alternatives upon which to settle
the case, instead of wording the decision in such sweeping terms; for example, that
the publication was not of and concerning plaintiff, as is remarked by Justice Brennan:
"... the evidence was constitutionally defective ...it was incapable of supporting the
jury's finding that the allegedly libelous statements were made 'of and concerning'
respondents" (supra note 1 at 288). Moreover, from an examination of the case, it is
evident additional grounds such as jurisdiction, or procedural due process could have
aptly resolved the case. However, the Court realized the necessity of departing from
the traditional narrowest basis notion, for such a handling would have deprived the
Court of the salutary gains of restraint otherwise accomplished. For a discussion in great
depth of these alternative methods open to the Court, see Note, 60 Nw. L. REv. 95
(1965).
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and civil disorder, whereon error in reported occurrence is more apt to be79
come the rule rather than the exception.
The latest pronouncement by the courts of New York upon the extensiveness of the "public official" rule is found in Gilligan v. King. 0 The
plaintiff, a police lieutenant in the New York City Police Department,
shot and killed a Negro youth who allegedly threatened plaintiff with a
knife. The defendants caused posters to be circulated which bore a picture of plaintiff, in a police uniform, and were entitled "Wanted for Murder." The court ruled the case must be decided within the scope of the
Times ruling, and thereby held plaintiff to the "public official" standard. In
arriving at such a conclusion, the court recognized that past decisions have
shown a liberality in extending the doctrine to persons not occupying public office, in fact even so far as to "embrace all persons in the public
arena." 8' However, confronted with an excellent argument by counsel for
plaintiff, the court diverted from discussion of "public officials," and instead interpreted the Times decision as encompassing all debate on public
issues designed to bring about "political and social changes desired by the
people."8 2 In conclusion, the court stated that in matters of public interest which raise public questions, the ruling of the Times case is appropriate; and the discussion of the conduct of a person involved within a central
public issue cannot be found actionable unless there is proof of "actual
malice" generated by erroneous statements of fact.
In summation, it can be readily seen that the doctrine of the "public
official" enunciated in the Times case has successfully encompassed defamations involving matters of public concern or, to borrow one court's
interpretation, anyone who seeks "the spotlight.., of public prominence."
The question remains, whether or not the Supreme Court envisioned such
expansion of the rule. The reluctance of the Court, in the Times case and
the few decisions subsequent thereto, to impose any limitation upon the
application of the rule, seems somewhat determinative of the thinking of
the Court. It should be noted that the extreme liberality to which some
courts have leaned in finding a basis for their decision evidently derives
from the effort of the Supreme Court to eliminate the scars of decades of
segregation in this nation. It is to this end that the "public official" is directed. This is "one of the major public issues of our times," as Justice
Brennan said, and it "would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional
protection."83 In fact, the lower federal state court decisions that appar79

Supra note I at 234.
80 246 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
81 ld.at 313.
The "social change" desired to be wrought by such villification of plaintiff was the
denial of the right of off-duty policemen to carry guns, and the establishment of a
civilian review board to bear citizen's complaints.
83 Supra note 1 at 271.
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ently divert from the bulk of the decisions strictly interpreting the Times
ruling, have done so in cases involving the issue of segregation,8 4 in some
form or another. It is to this end that the rule should be directed, to open
debate on the most acute public issue of the time, the equality of man. "To
many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our
all." 8 5
CONCLUSION

The final point of discussion concerns the ramifications of this rule:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits
a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating
to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual
malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not.8 6

The application of this federal rule is mandatory in all actions maintained
by a "public official," whatever that term includes, and prohibits a state
from awarding damages for libel against the "citizen-critic" of the "public
official." Secondly, the Illinois Constitution of 1870, at article II, section 4,
permits recovery for libel, both civil and criminal, unless the matter published was true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable
ends. The Times case established that falsehoods coupled with malice, actual and not implied, remain the only grounds upon which a "public official" may recover. The Illinois constitutional requirement of truth, therefore, is now inapplicable. Furthermore, as pointed out by Justice Brennan,8 7
84

Of interest is the concurring opinion of Justice Black in which he finds in such

cases the critics should have an absolute right to criticize the conduct of public officials, because "One of the acute and highly emotional issues in this country arises
out of the efforts of many people, even including some public officials, to continue
state-commanded segregation of races in the public schools and other public places ... "
(supra note 1 at 294). In disapproving the "stopgap measures" of the majority, Justice
Black clearly espouses his absolutist position: "We would, I think, more faithfully
interpret the First Amendment by holding that at the very least it leaves the people
and the press free to criticize officials and discuss public affairs with impunity." (Id.
at 296.) In Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion, we again find dissatisfaction with
the temperance of the majority: "the theory of our Constitution is that every citizen
may speak his mind and every newspaper express its view on matters of public concern
and may not be banned from speaking or publishing because those in control of government think that which is said or written is unwise, unfair, false, or malicious." (Id.
at 299.) It should be noted that the Supreme Court now recognizes a conditional privilege to defame on matters involving public officials, yet it remains conjectural whether
or not the Court will eventually enact an absolute privilege on all matters of public
concern; the states courts, for the most part, have acted quite vigorously.
85 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
86 Supra note 1.at 279-80.
87 In Garrison v. Louisiana, supra, note 57, the Court was confronted with a criminal libel action brought by a "public official." It should be mentioned the Court
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the interest of the public is greater than that of private reputation, so if the
matter is true, it may be inspired even by malice, for the Constitution protects one in the dissemination of truth. Thirdly, assuming the matter published is motivated by an intent to inflict harm, the motive is inconsequential as such, but yet if there is an intent to inflict harm through the use of a
falsehood, or a deliberate lie, here the protection of the Constitution
ceases, and liability attaches.
Therefore, it must be said that article II, section 4 of the Illinois Constitution loses significance where litigation has been commenced by a
"public official." First, if the matter published is true, the Supreme Court
stated that the reasons or motives inspiring the communication are of no
consequence, for truth, in matters of public concern, is an absolute defense. Secondly, since freedom of expression on public affairs "is the essence of self-government," the only matter in which one can be held liable,
even under the jurisdiction of the Illinois courts, would be upon a finding
of a defamatory misstatement of fact published with "actual malice." If
the matter is false, but contains no showing of "actual malice," or is a true
statement yet instigated by the most scurrilous of motives, the defendant
is exonerated of any damage award.
The problem engendered by the Court's ruling in the Times case will
require substantial litigation to solve, in that the solution remains with the
Court to determine the boundaries of the rule, and until the Court takes
such action, the state courts shall select their position somewhere between
police commissioners 'and public concern, and label that person or thing
qualified for the privilege of the Times case. :Because of the perplexity,
and the national importance of such a resolution, the decision lies with the
Supreme Court, and yet, as one may readily determine, the day will be
long in coming when the Court, in such a question as presented here, will
delineate or infringe its scope of protection of the most coveted right:
freedom of expression. For this reason alone, the Illinois Constitution
should not be revised to accommodate the Times doctrine as to the immunity of the "public official" critic.

Donald Bertucci
eschewed the requirements of "good motives and for justifiable ends" in actions involving such officials or public issues, and incorporating the standards of the Times case
to these facts, the elusive standards for the obviation of criminal libel in those stated
areas will undergo the same metamorphosis as that experienced by civil libel in relation
to "public officials."

